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  21. Introduction 
 
Numerous theories against the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1978), have 
attempted to reconcile empirical findings concerning under and over-reaction of asset 
prices to significant information events. The purpose of this study is to test how robustly 
these competing theories hold up in laboratory markets where the temporal and spatial 
distribution of information can be precisely controlled. Experience with asset markets 
both in the field and the laboratory suggests that human investors behave in a more 
complicated and strategic manner than in any ad hoc models or simulations so far 
constructed. 
Empirical results on asset price responses to news events seem to support systematic 
under-reaction in which average post-event returns hold the same sign as pre-event date 
returns (Jagadeesh and Titman, 1993)
1. Meanwhile, numerous studies conversely note 
that investors can over-react causing price movement featuring disproportional price 
changes followed by subsequent reversions (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) 
2. The anomalies 
literature tends to suggest that in the short to medium run, returns appear to exhibit 
continuation, while over-reacting return reversals are more likely to occur in the long run. 
In either case, price adjustments are considered to be biased. 
The anomalies literature has assembled abundant counter-evidence to challenge 
market efficiency hypotheses, but not provided a unifying alternative theory. Fama (1998) 
points out that even though market efficiency is “a faulty description of price formation”, 
the alternative hypotheses are “vague” and rarely tested: this he deems as “unacceptable”. 
In other words, any alternative must also be tested to prove that it outperforms market 
efficiency theory’s prediction that the expected value of abnormal returns is zero, and that 
deviation from zero in either direction can solely be attributed to chance.  
In this study, we address three distinct lines of approaches. The first approach 
advocates that the price reaction to news events is determined by psychological beliefs of 
an aggregate agent, including the overconfidence and self-attribution model by Daniel, 
                                                            
1 Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) argue that under-reaction is the cause for the success of momentum investing. 
Bernard and Thomas (1990), and many others, have documented drift after earnings surprises for up to 12 
months after the initial surprise.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1994) contend that the market 
phase of under-reaction is an important motive for stock repurchase. Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) found 
evidence that the pattern even persists in stock splits, which is the simplest  corporate event. Abarbanell and 
Lehavy (2003) found that analysts’ forecasting errors are correlated with the reporting choice a corporation 
makes in announcing its unexpected accruals. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2003) demonstrated that the 
analysts’ under-reaction to corporate announcements tends to decrease with the years of experience that they 
follow the firm. 
2 DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find that “loser” portfolios experience exceptionally large January return as late 
as five years after the initial portfolio formation. DeBondt and Thaler (1987) find that there exists mean 
reversion in stock returns, and excess return to losers could be explained by a biased expectation of the future 
which over weighs recent information and under weighs the long term average. DeBondt and Thaler (1990) 
find that security analysts’ forecasts are overoptimistic and exhibit frequent revisions. Dreman and Lufkin 
(2000) argue that the profitability of contrarian strategies results from the existence of over-reaction and that 
psychological factors may explain the origin of over-reaction. 
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representative bias by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, hereafter BSV) and the 
disposition effect model by Frazzini (2006). The second approach advocates that the 
types of reactions are driven by different groups of investors, featuring the information 
transmission model with heterogeneous agents by Hong and Stein (1998, hereafter HS). 
These two approaches both regard under- and over-reaction as two distinct phenomena. 
The third approach features Fama’s (1998) risk-based explanation, arguing that under- 
and over-reaction is purely a reflection of risk that are not captured by asset pricing 
models. 
Our laboratory test utilizes the model presented in HS (1999) to generate the asset 
valuation process experienced by investors. The asset pays a liquidation value to its 
owner when time reaches maturity with its book value unit is subject to a series of 
surprises during its lifetime and information in each period available for the informed to 
compute the expected liquidation value, i.e. intrinsic value. Common knowledge amongst 
investors exists about the underlying process and the ultimate state-dependent payoff, and 
also concerning a periodic structure of information release. Public information 
disseminates instantaneously throughout the population, while private information 
reaches only a subgroup of insiders. Information is both dispersed over time and 
asymmetrically throughout the investor population, generating a process of HS (1999) 
information diffusion. 
We identify under- and over-reaction with the advantage of knowing perfectly the 
intrinsic values. Our methodology reveals under-reaction as the predominant short-term 
and long-term regularity in most markets. To demonstrate the necessity of knowing the 
intrinsic value, we also use the traditional return sign characterization to sort our data and 
confirm the worry that observed anomalies can be created by researchers ignorant of 
intrinsic value. When taking intrinsic value into account, we find that the traditional 
continuation/reversal of returns signs does not consistently indicate true under/over-
reaction, as it may easily be misinterpreted absent the knowledge of intrinsic value.  
 
Our experimental results demonstrate that: 
(1) Data do not support psychological based explanations, either over-confidence 
model or disposition effect model; 
(2) Underreaction and overreaction are not caused by different groups of investors. 
In particular, HS' information transmission model cannot explain the drift pattern 
of prices; 
(3) Risk cannot account for drifts; overpricing or under-pricing cannot be captured 
by risk-return relationship; 
(4) Adjustment to surprises is robustly insufficient and displays inertia. The inferred 
aggregate subjective probabilities displayed by these markets indicate that biased 
judgments tend to persist and that the markets exhibit belief continuation. The 
‘conservatism’ account of BSV is the sole model that best governs the inertia 
patterns among all testable theories. 
 
In addition, we find that over-reaction is also caused by cautiously conservative 
adjustments. No theory has ever linked cautiousness with overreacting behaviors. We 
  4hypothesize that over-reaction is just a by-product of cautiousness as well, and under- and 
over-reaction are categorized differently simply because of the difference in historical 
price positions relative to the intrinsic value. This is not so surprising, since mispricing, 
either over or under, would always be determined by the path in the intrinsic value. By 
carefully re-examining the overreaction cases in our data, we confirm that overreaction, 
either changing from under-pricing to over-pricing or changing from over-pricing to 
under-pricing, is mostly caused by prices falling behind the abrupt changes in the 
intrinsic value. 
To test the price inertia theory more generally, we run numeric simulations using 
parameters derived from the laboratory data. Without introducing anything other than 
short-term insufficient adjustment, a substantial level of overreaction (persistent return 
reversal) emerges: the source for this apparent overreaction is also that prices do not 
converge fast enough to track abrupt changes in intrinsic value, resulting in a turning in 
price direction. The more inadequate the adjustments to the changes in intrinsic value are, 
the more under-reaction patterns will prevail. We confirm that short term insufficient 
adjustment can be the sole driving factor in determining the under- and over-reaction 
regularities. Both instances are governed by how responsively the market prices adjust to 
information events, rather than driven by contrasting behavioral traits or the interaction of 
heterogeneous market participants. 
We conclude that informational efficiency cannot be fully described by any single 
theory surveyed in this paper. We argue that both short-run return continuations (driven 
by slow adjustment) and long-run return reversals (possibly the slow re-adjustments to 
the new intrinsic value) can be summarized as manifestations of inertia, and that the 
theoretical dichotomy between under-reaction studies and over-reaction studies can be 
inherently misleading. 
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 surveys some prominent 
existing theoretical models that attempt to explain empirical data. Section 3 specifies the 
experimental design we devised for the laboratory markets and states the testable 
hypotheses relating to the various theoretical models. Section 4 presents our data 
summary. Section 5 evaluates the validities of the five competing models and presents 
our simulation results. Section 6 proposes a price inertia based theory of under- and over-
reaction. Section 7 summarizes our findings briefly. 
 
2. Theories on Under- and Over-reaction 
 
A number of theoretical models have attempted to provide partial or ‘unified’ 
explanations for either under or over-reaction, or both regularities. The first approach 
features the defense of the efficient market hypothesis.  
2.1 Psychological Explanations 
The first approach features various models of investor psychology.  
DHS (1998) develop a model of investor overconfidence, examining how investors 
assimilate new information. The uninformed investors are not subject to judgment bias 
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investors are “overconfident” about the information they privately own, and as a result, 
overreact to this type of information. In addition, a second characteristic named “biased 
self-attribution” reinforces their over-confidence whenever public information is in 
agreement with their private signal. When public information is not in accordance with 
their private signal, biased self-attribution leads to dismissal of the information as noise. 
The model suggests that the market under-reacts to public information and over-reacts to 
private information so the responses produce short-term continuation of returns and long-
term reversals as public information eventually overwhelm the behavioral biases.  
BSV (1998) proposed a model known as a “conservatism bias”
1 (attributed to 
Edwards (1968)) which essentially means that individuals tend to underweight new 
information when updating their prior beliefs. Conservatism bias leads investors to 
update their beliefs very slowly in the face of new evidence. “Representativeness bias”, 
on the other hand, leads to the formation of biased estimates based on a small sample of 
observations. In the BSV model, the earnings follow a random walk but investors falsely 
perceive that there are two earning regimes. In regime A, earnings are mean-reverting 
and in regime B, earnings are trending. If investors believe regime A holds, price under-
reacts to changes in earnings because investors mistakenly think the change is likely to be 
temporary; if investors believe regime B holds, they incorrectly extrapolate the trend and 
the price over-reacts. Overall, investors form prior beliefs about future prospects and the 
prior beliefs carry over to future price formation.  
Frazzini (2006) proposes that the presence of “disposition effect”
2, initiated by 
Shefrin and Statman (1985), will depress prices following good news as investors rush to 
sell to lock in paper gains, and will halt prices from falling following bad news as 
investors are reluctant to sell absent a premium. The former would lead to higher 
subsequent returns while the latter would lead to lower subsequent returns. Therefore, the 
disposition effect posits that a past capital gain or loss will shape the subsequent price 
formation, a unique explanation for asset price under-reaction. 
2.2 Heterogeneous Investors 
The second theoretical approach focuses on the market microstructure. Hong and 
Stein (HS, 1999) hypothesize that the market contains two groups of investors who trade 
based on different strategies. Informed investors base their trades on private signals about 
future cash flows while technical investors base their decisions on a limited history of 
prices. Information obtained by informed investors is transmitted slowly into the market, 
leading to an under-reaction pattern in returns. Technical investors rely on the past 
history of prices and extrapolate the trend too far, reinforcing momentum and pushing 
price away from intrinsic value which leads to an eventual reversal in returns. No 
                                                            
1 See Richards Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999. He wrote: “As a general 
rule, people are too slow to change an established view, as opposed to being to willing to change. The human mind is 
conservative. It resists change.” 
2 This is a behavioral tendency on the part of investors to hold onto their losing stocks to a greater extent than they hold 
onto their winners. (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). O’dean (1998) and Grinblatt and Han (2005) modeled or documented 
evidences that investors
2 indeed rush to sell after capital gains and are reluctant to sell after capital loss. 
  6assumption on the limitations of psychology is made. HS posit that information 
aggregation failure leads markets to under-react, and consequently, this under-reaction 
will be more pronounced when information updates have higher asymmetry (Hong, Lim 
and Stein, 2001). On other hand, HS model implies that prices will extrapolate trends and 
move to overshooting levels due to momentum trading actitivies. 
2.3 Risk based Explanation 
Fama (1998) presents three reasons for keeping market efficiency as a viable 
working model. First, the literature does not present a random sample of events and pays 
more attention to splashy results. Second, some apparent anomalies arise due to risk 
premium that are not captured by existing asset pricing models. The empirical evidence 
concerning observed investor mis-reactions can be the result of poorly specified risk 
factor models, with some effects disappearing entirely after accounting for size and book-
to-market ratio effects (Fama and French, 1996). Third, Fama (1998) surveys the 
anomalies literature and finds an even split between evidence for over-reaction and 
under-reaction and contends that long term efficiency is likely to hold up. The argument 
poses powerful skepticism upon the literature as there has long been absent a robust 
asset-pricing model.  
Empirical tests of these theories face multiple challenges in data collection. Firstly, 
the observed anomalies may well reflect changes in the fundamentals that are never 
known for certain but at best inferred. Secondly, the absence of a robust risk pricing 
model may depict the market’s rational response to changes in risk factors as improper 
reactions, an issue Fama (1998) referred to as the “bad-model problem”. And thirdly, it is 
hard to draw a distinction between public information and private information, as 
information leakage to insiders before public declaration cannot easily be detected. A 
laboratory controlled asset market is able to fully satisfy these difficult data requirements 
and offers a new approach to disentangling the impasse. Smith (1982) formalizes the 
notion of an economic system by specifying three constituent components: environment, 
institution, and behavior. In the laboratory all environmental parameters and institutional 
rules are perfectly controlled, thus providing a perspective that is impossible to obtain in 
the field.   
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
Our design adopts the HS (1999) information diffusion model in a multi-period 
exchange economy where information updates are temporally dispersed and 
asymmetrically held. Both the DHS and BSV models have a similar multi-period 
structure allowing long term behavior to emerge. Investors trade from period 1 until 
period 10 and receive a liquidation value per asset held after period 10 trading is 
complete. In each period either a specific subset of investors or all investors receive 
information concerning the assets’ liquidation value. There are no supply shocks in the 
market that may prevent equilibrium prices from fully revealing the investors’ private 
information. The structure of this economy is common knowledge. 
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3.1. The Random Walk Model 
Each investor is endowed with a portfolio of cash and a risky asset. The cash 
account may be regarded as a riskless bond, and for simplicity we normalize its interest 
rate to zero. The risky asset in the market pays a liquidation value of   at the end of 
period
T D
T , which is imperfectly known to investors at all times prior to the end of 
periodT . The liquidation value is determined by two components: a known starting book 
value, , plus a series of news surprises, each directly affecting the current book value, 
with one surprise between each consecutive pair of trading periods. Therefore, the book 
value of the asset as we proceed through time follows a symmetric binomial random walk: 
1 D
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In HS,  t ε   is randomly generated by a mean zero
1  normal distribution. The 
distribution for each surprise in our design is simplified to a binomial draw: 
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The surprises are independently and identically distributed. If a positive surprise 
occurs, a definite amount of money, u  will be added to the asset’s current book value; if 
a negative surprise occurs, a definite amount of money, d  will be subtracted from the 
asset’s current book value. There is a 50/50 chance of each outcome
2. Just before the 
final periodT , the final surprise is revealed and the liquidation value is ascertained.  
                                                           
 We  set , so each session lasts for 10 trading periods. The above model 
creates a binomial process in the intrinsic asset value. The following descriptive statistics 
can be obtained. 
10 = T
 
1 Our parameters for all market sessions sum to a mean zero distribution. In individual market sessions, the 
parameters can have negative, positive or zero mean.   
2 The content of information released to investors can be structured either to change the probabilities related 
to the state-dependent payoffs, or to change the payoffs (book value) directly. Generally, values are perceived 
as additive while probabilities are not. For this reason, we deliberately avoid the use of probabilities and use 
direct monetary payoff adjustments.  
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The variance for each surprise is:  
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By substituting (3) into (2), we derive the intrinsic value as of period t as:  
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Since the surprises are i.i.d, by substituting (4) into (2) we derive the variance for the 
liquidation value as of period t as:  
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By varying the relative sizes of positive surprise, +u , and negative surprise,  , 
we constructed three distinct environments: (a) the bearish environment, where the 
random disturbance is dominated by the relative size of the negative surprises and the 
book value tends to fall; (b) the neutral environment, where the random disturbance 
consists of positive and negative surprises that balance each other and the book value 
tends to remain constant over time; and (c) the bullish environment, where the random 
disturbance is dominated by the relative size of the positive surprises and the book value 
is expected to rise. To maintain the equality of the variance (7) of intrinsic value at each 
stage across all three environments, the spread between positive surprise and negative 
surprise is kept constant at
d −
80 = + d u .  Table I gives the parameter details for each 
environment. 
Before the market opens, investors have been informed of which news environment 
they will face. It is common knowledge that each investor knows the distribution of the 
surprises and how the information updates will be provided to the investors. One surprise 
occurs between each pair of successive trading periods. The actual realizations and the 
corresponding asset value paths are shown in Figure 1. The random draws for each 
successive shock were predetermined by flipping a coin (Path 1, left panel in Figure 1) 
and were used for the first 12 sessions. The same set of realizations was reversed for the 
second 12 sessions (Path 2, right pane in Figure 1). The purpose of using a limited 
number of paths (only 2, one the converse of the other) in all sessions is to keep cross 
session data most comparable. The paired comparison will allow us to examine variables 
of concern without introducing other disturbances due to variation in sequence of draws.  
  9Informed investors can learn about two important values. One is the current book 
value,   (dotted line in  t D Figure 1), at which the asset value stands at the given point of 
time; the other is the intrinsic value,  (solid line in  ) ( T t D E Figure 1). The computation of 
intrinsic value (expected liquidation value) is illustrated in the instructions (Appendix C). 
As periods pass, the intrinsic value is gradually revealed with less uncertainty: that is, the 
possible range of the final liquidation value shrinks as successive surprises are realized 
and the book value converges to the liquidation value.  
 
3.2.   Information Updates: Public Information and Private 
Information 
The HS model argues that when not all investors are privy to information, the fully 
revealing equilibrium (Grossman, 1976) fails because of bounded rationality on the part 
of investors. The DHS theory of overconfidence and biased self-attribution argues that 
price moves derived from private information arrival are on average partially reversed 
over a longer time horizon, while price moves in reaction to the arrival of public 
information are positively correlated with later price changes.   
To address the elements of the HS and DHS models, we differentiate the level of 
privacy in the information updates. In the public information case, every investor in the 
marketplace simultaneously receives the same update on change in the value of the asset. 
In the private information case, only 4 out of 9 investors receive updated information on 
changes in asset value, while the rest are informed about their environment (bearish, 
neutral, and bullish) but receive no direct updates on book value changes. Common 
knowledge exists about the level of publicity in information announcements. Both HS 
and DHS models are much more complicated than our design is. We reduce their 
complexity to a substantive extent, allowing us to pose a strong-form test on their 
hypotheses.  Environment simplicity in laboratory studies generally ensures less noise, 
higher measurement accuracy, and stronger results. 
 
3.3. Trading Session Parameters 
Trading session parameters are given in Table II.  Caginalp, Porter and Smith (2001) 
find that the level of cash in the economy is an important factor in price formation. 
Therefore, through the initial endowments we control the ratio of cash to initial intrinsic 
value across the three environments. Liquidity level is kept at 50% across all 24 sessions 
that were run. (Approximately 50% cash relative to the market’s entire worth.) Each 
trading session has exactly 9 investors in the marketplace and each investor participates 
in only one trading session. 
3.4. Implementation 
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book (NYSE style). The trading platform is an Internet based, continuous time trading 
institution, which allows investors to trade in real time during each of the 10 market 
periods. Investors receive initial endowments of cash and assets. They can post bids and 
asks, and accept the best posted bid or ask in the market. Share and cash balances are 
automatically updated after each trade. Before the session begins, detailed instructions 
are provided to investors. They are given sufficient time to read through the instructions 
and the market monitor answers questions whenever an investor needs clarification. A 
variety of numerical examples are presented in the instructions. After finishing the 
instructions, investors must take a quiz consisting of 10 questions to ensure that they 
understand the environment in which they will trade. They are asked to review their 
instructions and repeat missed questions until they answer them correctly. Finally, before 
the session starts, investors are given a three-minute practice trading period to familiarize 
themselves with the mechanics of executing trades in the actual real time on-line market. 
3.5. Hypotheses 
The 3 different approaches listed in the Section 2 will have distinct implications for 
our data. 
3.5.1. Psychological Explanations 
DHS: Investors respond more aggressively to private information than to public 
information. 
DHS (1998) assumes that prices are set by the informed investors and the role of the 
uninformed is minimal. Their theory of overconfidence and biased self-attribution 
assumes that investors view themselves as more capable of evaluating securities than they 
actually are. As a result, the model argues that price moves driven by private information 
arrival are on average partially preserved in the long run, while price moves generated by 
the arrival of public information are positively correlated with later price changes. We 
should expect that investors will give more weight to information that is only available to 
them, and this would imply that they will respond more strongly to private information 
than to public information. Since self-attribution bias exerts its effect through 
overconfidence bias, we will only test the latter. To evaluate this, we compare the 
responsiveness to new information in two paired markets via a proxy adjustment ratio:  
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where   measures how distant the previous period mean price is away 
from the new intrinsic value in market
) ( , T t j D E Δ
j , and  t j P , Δ  measures the actual change in mean 
price across the two adjacent periods. DHS would imply that, in two paired markets, the 
following relationship must be found: 
  11  public t k private t j ratio adj ratio adj
| , | , _ _ >   (9)
 
where j and k subscript a pair of markets in the same news environment such that 
market j differs from market only in that information is private in the former.  k
 
BSV: investors under-weigh news surprises, and beliefs exhibit positive 
autocorrelation. 
BSV (1998) assumes that prices are driven by a single representative agent and that 
that agent exhibits the cognitive biases of conservatism and representativeness. Under the 
influence of conservatism, investors tend to underweight the arrival of new evidence 
when updating their beliefs, so their past beliefs tend to persist. Representative bias
1 
suggests that investors form subjective beliefs based on a limited number of observations 
that ignore existing information concerning the objective probability distribution 
governing the asset valuation process. If these effects are in play, we should expect that 
in each period new information will be inadequately manifested in trading prices, that is, 
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where β  is the estimation for adjustment ratio and φ is a constant that represents 
the change in the variance of intrinsic value across two adjacent periods (see Equation 
(7)). BSV predicts that 1 < β . 
In addition, if belief persistence exists, we would expect the subjective probabilities
2, 
as indicated by market price levels (  and ) encasing a positive surprise, to be 
serially correlated. 
t p ˆ 1 ˆ − t p
 
  0 ) ˆ , ˆ ( 1 > − t t p p COV   (11)
 
FRAZZINI:  price will respond less when both the capital gain sign is positive 
(negative) and the surprise sign is positive (negative). The adjustment is more complete 
when the two signs are opposing. 
Frazzini (2006) bases his predictions on the disposition effect. The essential 
argument is that when an asset is trading at a gain, a positive surprise will result in less 
                                                            
1 We do not offer a direct test of “representative bias”, as our design specifies the exact value paths (i.i.d), 
rather than a mixture of “trending” and “reverting” regimes. 
2 The objective probability must always be 0.5 for a positive surprise, while the subjective probability for a 
positive surprise can be inferred from the current book value, current price level and the number of remaining 
shocks. 
  12adjustment than a negative surprise because investors will rush to sell to lock in paper 
gains; and similarly, when asset is trading at a loss, a negative surprise will result in less 
adjustment than a positive surprise because investors will hold onto the asset and refuse 
to sell absent a premium. Thus Frazzini (2006) summarizes that when the signs are 
opposing the adjustment is complete, either because investors trading at a loss would be 
willing to accept the latest gain, or because investors trading at a gain would be willing to 
accept the latest loss. In our sessions, measuring the capital gain or loss is a simple task. 
According to Frazzini we would expect to observe that price adjustments following 
surprises would be less complete when the information content and the capital gain 
overhang have the same sign: 
 
  0 , 0 , | _ | _ < • > • Δ < Δ
t t t t i g t k i g t j ratio adj ratio adj   (12)
 
where  is the proxy for capital gains and   is the news surprise at periodt .  t g t i
3.5.2. Heterogeneous Investors  
 
HS: Pricing difference across two comparable periods in paired treatments can be 
attributed to information asymmetry. 
HS (1999) posit that under-reacting anomalies may be generated when information 
travels slowly. If information were scattered asymmetrically across different investors, 
those who rely on information accuracy for decision making would only act based on the 
information they are personally privy to; consequently, the process of information 
aggregation would fail. In the HS model of information aggregation failure, the market 
price equals to the weighted average of information implied values, discounted by the 
level of risk each group faces. In the private (asymmetric) information treatment, j, that 
price would be: 
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where  ] ) ( [ 1 1 VAR D E T • −θ   is the valuation of the uninformed group, 
] ) ( [ t T t VAR D E • −θ is the valuation of the informed group, and  and  are the 
weights for each group. Because the uninformed group is completely blocked from 
information updating for the entire time span of the trading horizon and they fail to infer 
from market price, their valuation in every period would be the same as their valuation in 
period 1; for the informed group, their valuation would be updated whenever new 
information arrives. Similar to the assumptions in the HS model, the agents would act as 
a representative agent and the risk preference parameter,
1 w 2 w
θ , is assumed to be homogenous. 
In the public information treatment k, each investor is equally informed, therefore, 
the equilibrium price is:  
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By subtracting (10) from (11), the following is derived: 
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The first item    gives the level information asymmetry across the two 
groups, while the second item   gives the difference in the level of risk 
(variability) that each group faces.  
t k j info diff , , _
t k j VAR diff , , _
HS’ interpretation of overreaction as a consequence of momentum trading can be 
directly verified by examining price time series, that is, if momentum activities fuels 
overreaction, overacting levels of prices can be directly observed. 
3.5.3. Risk Explanations 
 
FAMA:  Asset price reflects risk, that is, the higher the risk is, the higher the 
expected return required by investors to hold the asset. 
Fama (1998) argues that the under- and over-reaction anomalies are chance results, 
apparent long-term over-reaction to information is about as common as under-reaction, 
and post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-
event reversal. He claims that apparent anomalies arise from the method of data analysis, 
and most long-term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in 
technique; in other words, if risk were accurately measured, over-reaction and under-
reaction would be equally frequent and pricing would be unbiased.  
In our sessions, because there is only a single risky asset, the only source of 
uncertainty comes from that asset’s liquidation value. If the aggregate market has a mean-
variance utility type, the variance of the liquidation value as a proxy for risk. The 
following is a naïve risk return relationship model
1: 
 
  t t t VAR r E ε λ + • = ) (   (16)
 
where the expected return is t t T t t P P D E r E / ] ) ( [ ) ( − = ,  λ is risk premium ratio, 
is the variance of liquidating value at period t (see Equaltion (7)), and  t VAR t ε accounts 
for deviations due to chance. 
                                                            
1 Most models discussed in this paper, except Fama’s market efficiency model, are grounded in the structure 
of a one asset market; therefore, we did not use a multi-asset market. Evidence on mental accounting 
(Rockenbach, 2004) indicates that most investors tend to lump all risky assets into a single mental “account”, 
producing a situation that would degenerate into managing a single risky asset market. 
  144. Experimental Results 
4.1. Transaction Price Time Series and Drift 
The transaction prices of various market sessions evolve toward the intrinsic value 
in diverse manners. We observe all sorts of patterns including upward momentum, 
downward momentum, U-shaped and humped-shaped time series. Incidences where 
transaction prices occur outside the range of possible intrinsic values are rare. The time 
series of transaction prices in all 24 market sessions are shown in Figure 2. 
In the bearish environment, as shown in Panel 1-A (Session 3, 6, 13, and 16) and 
Panel 2-A (Session 5, 10, 15, and 22), prices converge to intrinsic value from above. In 
the neutral environment, as shown in Panel 1-B (Session 1, 11, 17, and 19) and Panel 2-B 
(Session 4, 9, 21, and 23) in Figure 2, the transactions start slightly below intrinsic value 
and quickly track it in later periods. In the bullish environment, as in Panel 1-C (Session 
2, 8, 4, and 20) and Panel 2-C (Session 7, 12, 16, and 24), prices converge to intrinsic 
value from below. Under standard von-Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, agents price a 
symmetric payoff distribution below its expected value if they are risk averse, and price a 
symmetric payoff distribution above its expected value if they are risk seeking. However, 
we observe an inconsistency in that agents seem to be risk averse in pricing in the bullish 
environment and risk seeking in pricing in the bearish environment, even though the level 
of risk (variance of the intrinsic value) is the same for a particular period across all 
environments. The long-dash curve in Figure 2 is the Lowess
1  fitted line of the 
transaction prices, a computational method developed to assess scatter plots by robust 
locally weighted fitting. As shown in Figure 2, in the bearish and bullish environment, 
the market prices show clear patterns of downward and upward drift respectively. If we 
define under-reaction as the continuation of return signs, both cases strongly demonstrate 
this type of under-reaction drift. Under the neutral environment, the patterns are mixed 
but with smaller average deviations; most price trends are relatively flat, while some 
show a slight upward drift and some have a hump-shaped curve. 
The 12 sessions on the left side of Figure 2 are sessions where information updates 
are publicly announced, while the 12 sessions on the right side are sessions where 
information updates are privately revealed to a subset of investors. The drifting patterns 
are similar across the two information conditions. (We will discuss this matter in more 
detail below.) 
4.2. The Prevalence of Under-reaction 
The Lowess fitted curves offer an intuitive representation of under-reaction patterns 
in which returns hold the same sign from the news release at the session opening to the 
liquidating point.  
                                                            
1 Lowess was introduced in “Visual and Computational Considerations in Smoothing Scatter plots by Locally 
Weighted Fitting,” W. S. Cleveland, Computer Science and Statistics: Eleventh Annual Symposium on the 
Interface, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, 1978, pages 96-100. 
  15Laboratory studies provide the advantage of being able to directly assess both the 
signs and the magnitudes of reaction, rather than having to solely rely on prices to infer 
deviations from intrinsic value. The average deviations of transaction prices from 
intrinsic value in every trading period across all market sessions are plotted in Figure 3. 
Deviations are essentially equivalent to expected returns. 
As shown in Figure 3, in the bearish environment we observe large overpricing 
(negative expected returns) relative to the intrinsic value in almost all markets, with 
higher deviations in initial periods. In the bullish environment, we observe large under-
pricing (positive expected returns) relative to the intrinsic value in 7 out of 8 sessions, 
with all sessions being more severely underpriced initially. In the neutral environment, a 
roughly even split is found between under-pricing and overpricing. The drifting patterns 
in bullish and bearish sessions epitomize the definition of under-reaction, while the 
neutral sessions appear to show return reversals in numerous cases even as they flatten 
out on average.  
To construct a better classification rule of sorting underreation and overreaction for 
each period, we consider evaluate the temporal position of transaction prices relative to 
intrinsic values. Below we define under-reaction using a price migration rule with both a 
short and long-term lens. 
The long-term identification is judged by the price position relative to the intrinsic 
value over the session’s entire duration.  In all sessions, before beginning all investors are 
informed about the (approximately normal) distribution of the asset liquidation value. 
Suppose the prices start on one side of this intrinsic value, move away from past price 
(average price in all past periods) and migrate to the other side of the intrinsic value, then 
the pricing of the trading period is interpreted as over-reaction; if the prices keep 
proximate to past price and always fall short of reaching the intrinsic value, the pricing of 
a trading period is interpreted as under-reaction. (See the left panel in Figure 4.)  
We precisely define the short-term reaction for each trading period such that the 
price migration is examined within the two-period time window enveloping an 
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where  1 − t P is the average transaction price in period t-1 and the sign of the deviation 
is dependent upon the position of price relative to intrinsic value in the previous period. 
We precisely define the long-term reaction magnitude in the same fashion except 
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  16where  t P   is the average transaction price in the current period ,  t 1 ... 1 − t P is the 
average transaction price over all previous periods,  is the intrinsic value as of 
periodt , 
) ( T t D E
) ( 1 ... 1 T t D E − is the average intrinsic value over all previous periods; and the sign 
of the deviation is dependent upon the position of average past price relative to average 
past intrinsic value. 
In both cases, if the reaction magnitude is negative, the pricing will be interpreted as 
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The distribution of reaction magnitude is shown in Figure 5. Among 238 trading 
periods in 24 sessions, in the long run, 71.8% of the periods have current trading prices 
staying on the same side of intrinsic value as previous average price, while 28.2% of the 
periods display migration to the other side of intrinsic value. In the short run, 82.8% of 
the periods have current trading prices staying on the same side of intrinsic value as the 
previous period price, while 17.2% of the periods display migration to the other side. We 
note that both distributions are left skewed with a mean less than zero, indicating that 
under-reactions dominate not only in frequency but in magnitude too. This confirms the 
empirical findings suggesting dominance of under-reaction in the short run, and also 
rejects Fama’s (1998) claim that under-reaction and over-reaction cancel out on average 
in the long run. 
In addition, we evaluate our methodology against the traditional return sign 
characterizations. We measure return as the price percentage change across two adjacent 
periods, and classify the periods where pre-event-period return and post-event-period 
return have the same signs as “under-reaction”, and opposing signs as “over-reaction”. 
We found 113 periods of “under-reaction” and 80 periods of “over-reaction”.  For the 
long term return, we classify the periods where pre-event cumulative return
1 and post-
event return have the same signs as “under-reaction”, and opposing signs as “over-
reaction”. We found 93 periods of “under-reaction” and 83 periods of “over-reaction”.    
However, an implicit assumption is made that the continuation of return signs 
indicates inadequate past adjustment, while the reversal of return signs indicates 
excessive past adjustment. The problem lies in that we generally do not have the 
knowledge of whether: (a) the magnitude of the previous adjustment is sufficient or 
excessive; (b) the previous price is converging to or diverging from the intrinsic value. A 
glimpse at the time series paths shown above suggests that these worries are not 
superfluous. For instance, in Session 21, the turning in return sign at period 5 is an 
                                                            
1  Fama (1998) argues that long-term return should be computed by average abnormal return (AAR) or 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as buy-and-hold return (BAHR) tends to have higher errors. We use CAR 
in our analysis. 
  17accurate reflection of the turn in the intrinsic value; and in Session 4, the continuation of 
return around period 5 is actually a movement away from intrinsic value. 
Pure return-sign based classification is problematic because a change in return sign 
is not necessarily the result of previous excessive adjustment and a stationary return sign 
is not necessarily the result of previous inadequate adjustment; rather, the behavior of a 
post event return can simply be a correct adjustment to the new status quo.  
     
4.3 Sources of Overreaction 
The plots in the neutral environment in Figure 3 hint an important potential cause for 
over-reaction. Most over-reactions appear in the neutral environment, yet Panel 1-B and 
2-B in Figure 2 show that it is the change in the intrinsic value rather than the change in 
the price that generates the patterns.  
The migration of price from one side of intrinsic value to the other side is considered 
as overreaction; however, the migration can be either caused by the excessive adjustment 
in price or the change in the intrinsic value coupled with sluggish price adjustment. We 
conduct analysis on 41 periods of overreaction out of a total of 238 periods. Table III 
tabulates all the overreaction periods into four scenarios: (a) price migrates from below to 
above and the news surprise is positive; (b) price migrates from below to above and the 
news surprise is negative; (c) price migrates from above to below and the news surprise is 
positive; d) price migrates from above to below and the news surprise is negative. Case (a) 
and (c) indicate that the price adjustment not only corrects the previous period deviation 
but also absorb fully the news surprise, therefore, both cases relates to excessive 
adjustment version of overreaction. Case (b) and (d) indicates that the price adjustment is 
insufficient such that it does not absorb fully the news surprise, therefore, both cases 
relates to insufficient adjustment. 
The results in Table III suggest that overreaction (migration to the other side of 
intrinsic value) is mostly generated by sluggish adjustment (34 periods), rather than 
excessive adjustment (only 7 periods). 
Indeed, we will examine the overall magnitude of the sluggish adjustment in Section 
5.1.2; indeed, we will show that sluggish adjustment prevails in our data and the average 
adjustment to news surprise is only 38%. (Refer to Table V) 
 
 
5. Verifying the Competing Models 
Section 4 has demonstrated the dominance of under-reaction phenomenon across all 
sessions, especially under the bullish and bearish environments. In this Section, we will 
evaluate more specifically the unique predictions of the five competing models.  
  185.1. Psychological Explanations 
5.1.1. DHS 
DHS (1998) predicts that agents will respond more actively to privately held 
information. That means that when information updates reach only an insider group, due 
to overconfidence those insiders will trade more aggressively and lead the market to 
over-reaction. 
As specified in the hypotheses, DHS has straightforward implications for the rate of 
adjustment. We derive the difference in adjustment rate by pairing the adjustment rate in 
a particular period of the private information treatment with the same period of the public 
information treatment:  
 
  public t j private t j t k j ratio adj ratio adj rate diff | , | , , , _ _ _ − =   (20)
 
DHS suggests that the term should be strictly positive while HS suggests that it 
should be strictly negative. Figure 6 provides the histogram for the paired difference in 
adjustment rates.   
The histogram indicates that the distribution is hardly distinguishable from the zero 
mean symmetric normal distribution, and we cannot reject that hypothesis given the 
Student t test generates a p-value of 0.82. 
 
Table IV lists the average turnover, bid-ask spread, mean price, median price and 
closing price for all 24 sessions, using each trading period as an observation. Across the 
two information conditions, none of these measures differ substantially except volume. It 
is noteworthy that there is considerable reduction in volume when information is 
privately revealed. We note that the reduction is mostly derived from uninformed 
investors who involved in many fewer transactions than their counterparts in the public 
information treatment. 
5.1.2. BSV Model 
BSV argues that once agents form beliefs they will become reluctant to change this 
prior and will tend to under weigh the arrival of new information. In Figure 7, we graph 
the adjustment rate distribution and show it is leptokurtic and positively skewed. In 
60.7% of the cases price adjusts in the correct direction but insufficiently,  in 26.4% of 
the cases price adjusts in the opposite direction of the surprises, and in 12.9% of the cases 
price adjusts in excess of the intrinsic value change. Insufficient adjustment is the 
dominant phenomenon. Starting from the initial deviation from intrinsic value until 
eventual convergence, the sessions adjust average valuation hesitantly on the path to 
liquidation. As prices are the manifestation of agents’ beliefs, the inertia in prices can be 
understood as inertia in willingness to change beliefs. 
Next, we run regressions on how swiftly prices on average adjust to intrinsic value 
changes. The regressions in Table V show that the average adjustment to surprises to 
intrinsic value is around 38%.  The effect is robust using mean, median and closing prices, 
  19and the coefficients are significant at 0.01 level. In addition, the dummy 
variable does not have a significant effect on the rate of adjustment.  k private
The BSV model also implies that agents tend to ignore new information and exhibit 
belief persistence. To demonstrate the belief continuation argument of BSV model, we 
derive the session’s aggregate subjective probability estimates from observed prices. The 
natural probability for a Head draw is always 0.5. However, the subjective probability of 
agents in the sessions can hardly be the same as 0.5 because prices persistently deviate 
from intrinsic value. In every trading period, given the current level of price, we can 
derive the subjective probability (of a Head draw). This offers a perspective that allows 
us to probe the investors’ subjective beliefs
1. 
We denote a session’s aggregate belief on the probability of Head draw in period t 
as . Because current period price reflects the market’s average belief on the probability 
of a Head draw, the following equality should hold: 
t p ˆ
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t P   is the average trading price in period .  t Figure 8 shows the evolution of 
subjective probability across adjacent periods in the 24 sessions. Most points in the 
scatter plot reside in the 1
st and 3
rd quadrants, indicating that an underestimated subjective 
probability (negative deviation) in one period is likely to be followed by an 
underestimated subjective probability (negative deviation) in the next period, too. This is 
in accordance with BSV’s prediction of belief persistence. 
5.1.3. Disposition Effect 
The disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; O’dean, 1998; and Grinblatt and 
Han, 2001) has been given much attention in recent empirical research.  
This theory predicts that investors will rush to sell after a capital gain and are 
reluctant to sell after a capital loss. Frazzini (2006) proposes that the presence of 
‘disposition’ investors will depress prices following good news as they rush to sell to lock 
in paper gains, and will halt prices from falling following bad news as they are reluctant 
to sell absent a premium.  Table VI summarizes the predictions of Frazzini (2006).  
The key variable for testing the disposition effect is the measure of capital gains. 
Similar to Frazzini (2006), we measure the reference price as the volume weighted 
historic average price:  
 
                                                            
1 Measuring implied probability offers us a unified way to look at deviations across different sessions. It has 
an important advantage over measuring deviation directly. Because 1 unit of deviation in the first period 
tends to be less significant than 1 unit of deviation in the latest period, implied probability provides a 
convenient way of weighting deviations across periods. 
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The results in Table VII clearly reject Frazzini (2006). We observe more adjustment 
in cases where news content and capital gains hold the same sign, contrary to the 
disposition effect prediction. In addition, the number of asks in the market seems to 
remain relatively unchanged across various gain conditions. 
5.2. Heterogeneous Investors: HS 
Hong and Stein’s information diffusion model suggests that information aggregation 
failure arising from information asymmetry will keep the market price away from full 
information implied values. As specified in Equation (9) in our hypotheses, the price in a 
given period of a private information session and in the same period of a public 
information session should reflect the information asymmetry and associated difference 
in uncertainty amongst investors. Note that for each pair of comparable periods, every 
factor is kept the same except for how many investors are told the content of surprises.  
Table VIII runs regression analysis on Equation (9) and provide no support for the 
relationship between information asymmetry and price difference. That is, the average 
valuation of informed traders and uninformed traders does not capture the temporal 
development of prices. This result comes as no surprise, as Figure 2 shows that the price 
series in the two treatments are extremely alike. 
We do not observe that continuation of trends leads price to migrate to the other side 
of intrinsic value. In most sessions, the markets spend the whole experiment session in 
converging to the intrinsic value. (See to Figure 3) It is clearly shown that under-reaction 
prevails while overreaction reversals happen mostly when the intrinsic value evolution 
changes its initial cause. Hence, there is no reasonable basis to assume over-reaction in 
our data is caused by a separate set of momentum traders.  
 
5.3. Risk based Explanation: Fama 
Fama (1998) argues that on average over-reaction and under-reaction should cancel 
out. The histograms in Figure 5 indicate that under-reaction dominates over-reaction both 
in magnitude and in frequency.  
Empirical findings of anomalies can arise from imperfect evaluation of risk factors, 
but we can precisely measure the price deviations in our data against current intrinsic 
  21value uncertainty. In our trading sessions there is only one source of uncertainty: the 
variance of the intrinsic value which is a linear function of the number of pending 
surprises. The risk associated with the intrinsic value uncertainty, as measured by its 
variance, declines over time. If agents are risk averse (seeking) in valuing the symmetric 
intrinsic value distribution, the required rate of return should be positive (negative) to 
entice trade. 
We do not observe such consistency. Figure 9 shows that the aggregate risk-return 
compensation ratio (the long-dash line) is indistinguishable from zero. However, though 
investors are exposed to the same level of uncertainty in the same period in all the 
environments, they consistently require a premium to final claims in the bullish 
environment, a zero premium in the neutral environment, and strikingly, a discount in the 
bearish environment. The higher the risk, the more pronounced is this effect. 
If the variance of intrinsic value is not a perfect proxy for risk, a weaker test would 
be that since for any given period t   each unit held is exposed to the same surprise 
distribution, with the same level of variability, the compensations across different 
environments should, on average, be equal to each other. 
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Table IX indicates that the compensations in each period are not equal across the 
three news environments, but there exists a systematic difference. Under the bearish 
environment an average negative expected return of -15.7% is observed, while under the 
bullish environment an average positive expected return of 7.3% is observed. In neutral 
environment, the overall average expected return is 0. A stage-wise cross section 
comparison reveals this result even more convincingly, as the expected return is always 
largest for the bullish environment and smallest for the bearish environment. This 
substantively rejects Equation (20) and seriously questions whether under-reaction (over-
reaction) can be explained by risk attitudes. 
6. A Theory of Price Inertia: Numeric Simulations 
In Section 4.3, a tentative conclusion is reached that sluggish adjustment is 
responsible for the emergence of overreaction. It remains unverified whether price inertia 
can be the sole driver of the relative frequencies of under- and over-reaction.  
This Section will simulate, using parameters obtained from the data, to demonstrate 
the speed of adjustment is the key factor in generating under- and over-reaction. That is, 
when the market response to news surprise is sluggish, both regularities will emerge with 
the former outnumbering the latter; when the market response to news surprise is 
excessive, both regularities will again emerge but the latter outnumbering the former. The 
only input variable to be controlled is the speed of adjustment and we will analyze the 
results respectively. 
  226.1 Simulation Setup 
The analysis has indentified insufficient adjustment as a prevailing phenomenon 
under all conditions. We now turn to a simulation experiment to examine how the speed 
of short-term adjustment might impact the under- and over-reaction patterns we observe.  
The set-up of the simulation is exactly the same as laid out in the experiment design. 
To drive the simulation we derive two parameter values from the data: the starting price 
and the adjustment ratio. Our data imply that:  and 
. 
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The purpose is to vary the distribution of adjustment ratio and evaluate how the 
under- and over-reaction patterns change accordingly. We choose three alternate 
distributions for adjustment ratio: insufficient adjustment,  , 
which was observed in our data, appropriate adjustment,  , 
which might be observed if price adjustments were accurate on average, and excessive 
adjustment,  , which might be observed if price 
adjustments were aggressive on average. In addition, we use both the short-term and 
long-term perspectives introduced earlier to analyze the reaction magnitudes.  
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6.2 Simulation Results and Discussion 
The simulation results suggest that the adjustment ratio is the key factor driving the 
reaction distributions. When the average adjustment ratio is below 1, under-reaction 
dominates (Figure 10, Panel A-1 and B-1); when the average adjustment ratio is 1, under-
reaction is as frequent as over-reaction (Figure 10, Panel A-2 and B-2); when the average 
adjustment ratio is greater than 1, over-reaction dominates (Figure 10, Panel A-3 and B-
3). These results hold for both short and long-term perspective (See Table X). There is a 
slight tendency for over-reaction to grow when switching to long-term perspective, which 
is consistent with empirical results that over-reaction tend to show up more in the long 
term. 
The simulation reveals an important message: over-reaction and under-reaction are 
both by-products of the adjustment responsiveness in the environment. Overreaction is 
also created by inertia because the price adjustment does not catch up with the speed of 
change in the intrinsic value. Whether the pricing at a point should be classified as under- 
or over-reaction largely depends on the past, whereas the point-of-time prices in the two 
labeling situations could have been exactly the same. Note that at any point of time, price 
is slowly correcting its error. In our sessions, they simultaneously derive in the 
proportions observed from the same cause: slow adjustment. 
 
7. Conclusion 
How market prices incorporate the arrival of new information has long been a puzzle 
to theorists and empirical researchers. In this paper, we designed and collected data from 
controlled laboratory markets that replicate a version of the HS (1999) information 
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dispersed and asymmetrically held across individual investors. The multi-period 
exchange economy allowed us to evaluate observed price dynamics against the 
predictions of various competing models.  
The trading price time series data manifests under-reacting drifts in both bullish and 
bearish environments. The bullish environment was usually interpreted by investors as 
not as good enough (under-pricing persisted), while the bearish environment was 
interpreted as not bad enough (over-pricing persisted). This gives the impression that 
agents are risk seeking in bearish environments and risk averse in bullish environments, 
even though at each period, we designed the risk exposure to be identical across these 
environments. We found the risk-return premium relationship does not hold in attributing 
abnormal returns to chance. 
Information asymmetry had no significant affect on price adjustments, both over the 
short and long terms. The level of information asymmetry did not explain the price 
difference across two comparable trading periods. This questions the HS’ arguments that 
the failure of information aggregation may be a reason for under-reaction and that 
asymmetric information slows down the adjustment process toward intrinsic value. The 
DHS overconfidence model predictions are not confirmed in our private information 
treatment, as privately informed investors were not found to lead the markets to over-
reaction. Furthermore, capital gains and losses did not correlate with price adjustment 
magnitude in the fashion specified by the disposition effect model. 
An analysis of the sessions’ subjective probabilities indicated that biased judgments 
tend to persist and exhibit belief continuation. The inertia patterns discovered were most 
consistent with the conservatism account of BSV among existing theories.  
We identified both the short-run and long-run under and over-reaction distributions 
with the advantage of knowing perfectly the intrinsic asset values. Under-reaction is the 
predominant regularity in all markets in the short run, while under-reaction dominates the 
long term price behavior in both bullish and bearish environments, but dissipates in the 
neutral environment. We showed that the common technique of return sign 
characterization with ignorance of intrinsic value or accurate estimation techniques can 
produce misleading conclusions.  Over-reacting types of price adjustments were not 
necessarily the markets’ excessive adjustment to earlier information. That is, the initial 
adjustment might be appropriate, while later stage price reversals were the market’s re-
adjustment to a new intrinsic value, with inertia generating a prolonged period of 
opposite return signs.  
Sizable over-reaction is present in the clearly under-reaction predominated markets 
as well. This leads us to hypothesize: are under-reaction and over-reaction caused by the 
same matter? A re-examination of our results and a simulation with the parameters 
extracted from data suggest that consciously conservative adjustments alone provide an 
account for both under- and over-reaction regularities. The empirical and theoretical 
dichotomy of treating the two anomalies might be questionable. Our simulation suggests 
that simple inertia is the key factor in determining the distribution of reaction magnitudes, 
and that slow adjustment is the reason for both under- and over-reaction regularities 
observed. 
  24No single theory presented in this paper can totally summarize the informational 
efficiency shown in the data. Investors exhibited belief continuation and accordingly 
prices displayed inertia. Investors seemed to place considerable weight on their previous 
beliefs (past price) when forming valuations about uncertain future payoffs. Both short-
run return continuations (driven by slow adjustment) and long-run return reversals 
(possibly re-adjustments to evolutionary turns in intrinsic value) can be explained by 
price inertia (belief continuation). 
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Appendix A: Asset with a random walk intrinsic value and information 
diffusion 
 
Hong and Stein (1999) define an asset which pays a single dividend at the liquidating date. 
This liquidating dividend is ∑ = + =
T
j j T D D
1 0 ε . At each period , investors trade claims on 
the risky asset. The asset pays a single liquidating dividend at time
t
T .  ε ’s are the dividend 
innovations and are assumed i.i.d, normal random variables 
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To incorporate the notion that information moves gradually across the "newswatcher 
population", they divide this population into z equal-sized groups and every dividend 
innovation, j ε , can be decomposed into z  independent sub-innovations i j, ε , 
with z j j j i j , 2 , 1 , , ε ε ε ε + + = L , each with variance .  z /
2 ε
The timing of information release is as follows: at t, news about ε t+z−1, begins to spread, and 
newswatcher group 1 observes εt+z −1, 1, group 2 observes εt+z −1,2 , . . ., group z observes εt + z − 1, z. 
At t, each sub-innovation of εt+z −1, has been seen by a fraction 1/z of the total population. At t+1, 
the groups “rotate”, group 1 now observes εt+z−1, 2, group 2 observes εt+z−1, 3, . . ., group z observes 
εt + z − 1, 1. At t+1 the information εt+z −1 has spread further, and each sub-innovation of εt+z −1, has 
been seen by a fraction 2/z of the total population. Rotation continues until time t + z − 1, at which 
point every one of the z groups has directly observed each of the sub-innovations that comprise εt + 
z − 1. εt + z − 1, has become totally public by time t + z − 1.  
The parameter z can be thought of as a proxy for the rate of information flow. Higher values 
of z imply slower information diffusion
1. 
The model predicts that because newswatchers fail to infer intrinsic value from market prices, 
they rely on their private information in deciding their demand and consequently, under-reaction is 
more severe when information diffuses more slowly. Note that, though the authors claim the 
diffusion primarily occurs through dissemination across the population, it is in fact mixed cross-
population and over-time diffusion. The reason is simple: the faster that traders to get know future 
dividend innovations, the earlier they learn about their future situations.  The price at time t should 
equal to:  
Q z z z D P z t t t t t • − + + − + − + = − + + + θ ε ε ε / ] ... ) 2 ( ) 1 [( 1 2 1  
                                                            
1 Higher z, on the one hand, means more numbers of traders; and on the other hand, it means the diffusion of 
information for a longer time horizon. Therefore, higher z not only indicates slower diffusion across the 
investor public, but also more fundamental uncertainty that spans over time. 
  26where θ  is a function of newswatchers’ risk aversion and the variance of theε ’s. 
Glosten (1985) posits the opposite, that is, the price at time t should equal to: 
Q D P z t t • − = − + θ 1  
Nonetheless, the authors argue that investors will fail to infer intrinsic value from prices and 
such equilibrium will be impossible. 
HS has two essential features. First, as time passes and more value innovations are realized 
the uncertainty of the liquidating dividend declines. Second, there is information asymmetry 
among the investor public, with some investors holding a more accurate estimate of the intrinsic 
value. The first feature is readily feasible in the laboratory as long as we keep the time horizon 
finite. The second feature, asymmetry, is more difficult to implement in the laboratory exactly as 
specified by Hong and Stein (1999), because  rotation is an awkward scenario and rotating 
information concerning sub-innovations are not an intuitive concept to explain to investors. 
To make the scenario readily digestible for investors, we keep the first HS feature, delete the 
sub-innovation feature, and simplify the asymmetry among investor public by having a fixed 
group of investors that receive private information during the trading periods. As a design control 
this private information treatment is paralleled with a public information treatment where all 
investors are equally informed simultaneously. This simplification enables us to implement the 
laboratory trading sessions with much less cognitive cost on the part of investors and a much more 
intuitive explanation for the privileged few, while retaining the essential information diffusion 
both across time and the population. 
 
Appendix B: Data 
 
Data is available at http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/24mkt.txt 
Data dictionary is provided below: 
Info: 0="public",  1="private" 
Environment: -1="bad"; 0="neutral"; 1="good" 
Action  1="buy", 2="sell", 3="bid", 4="ask", 5="cancel buy", 6="cancel sell" 
 
Appendix C: Experiment Instructions 
 
Public Information, Bullish Environment: 
http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/rw_inc/page1.html 
Public Information, Neutral Environment: 
http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/rw_con/page1.html 
Public Information, Bearish Environment: 
http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/rw_des/page1.html 
 
Private Information, Bullish Environment, Informed Group: 
  27http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/private/rw_inc/page1.html 
Private Information, Bullish Environment, Uninformed Group: 
http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/dark/rw_inc/page1.html 
Private Information, Neutral Environment, Informed Group: 
http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/private/rw_con/page1.html 
Private Information, Neutral Environment, Uninformed Group: 
http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/dark/rw_con/page1.html 
Private Information, Bearish Environment, Informed Group: 
http://esi2.chapman.edu/sandler/private/rw_des/page1.html 
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Table I 
Table I. Parameterization for the News Surprises 
 
If the random draw is Head, book value will change by +u; if the random draw is Tail, book value will change by – d. 
Since the spread between positive and negative surprises is kept constant across three environments, u + d =80, the 
variance of the final liquidation value at each period is kept the same independent of the environment. 
Environment    Surprise 
(Total: 9)  Bearish Neutral  Bullish 
 
Head 
(p = 0.5) 
 
+ u +  20  + 40  + 60 
Tail 
(1 - p = 
0.5) 




Table II. Session Parameters 
 
Each session has 3 groups of 3 identically endowed investors who each receive a group specific portfolio of cash and shares. Liquidity 
ratio = total cash / expected total share worth.
Investor Endowments  Session 















Public  3,  6  13,18  9(3,3,3)  1100 1 750 2 400 3  360  1.04  Bearish  Private  5,10  15,22  9(3,3,3)  1100 1 750 2 400 3  360  1.04 
                   
Public  1,11  17,19  9(3,3,3)  1600 1  1100 2  600  3  540  1.02 
Neutral  Private  4,9  21,23  9(3,3,3)  1600 1  1100 2  600  3  540  1.02 
                         
Public  2,8  14,20  9(3,3,3)  2200 1  1500 2 800 3  720  1.04 
Bullish 
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Table III. Sources of Overreaction: Insufficient adjustment v.s. 
excessive adjustment 
 
Overreaction is classified when price migrates to the other side of intrinsic value across two 
adjacent periods. 41 of 238 periods are classified as overreaction periods in the data.  In 34 out 
of the 41 overreaction periods, prices do not catch up with the new intrinsic value and thus 
migrate to the other side; in 7 out of the 41 overreaction periods, prices adjustment excessively 
and migrate to the other side. 
 
Deviation from Intrinsic Value 
Surprise in Current Period 
Previous Period  Current Period +  – 
–  + 4 18 
+  –  16 3 
 
Table IV 
Table IV. Comparison on Other Measures across Information Condition 
 
The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. Each pair consists of the measures in a period of the private 
information sessions and the counterpart in the public information sessions. All other conditions remain the 
same except for the information privacy. The student t test hypothesizes that the paired difference holds a mean 
of zero. 
  Public Private  Student t Paired Comparison 
 p-value 





Bid-Ask Spread  188.9 
(129.3) 
221.6 
(158.9)  p=0.08 
Mean Price  542.7 
(111.8) 
538.7 
(116.2)  p=0.787 
Median Price  543.5 
(112.2) 
540.6 
(116.6)  p=0.84 
Closing Price  550.2 
(121.5) 
544.4 




  32Table V 
Table V. Feasible GLS Regressions on Adjustment Rate 
 
The number in parenthesis is the z-statistic. *** stands for 0.01 significance level, and ** stands for 0.05 significance level. 
The coefficients are estimated with generalized least squares, with heteroskedasticity and panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation. 
ΔPk,t represents the change in price in session k from period t-1 to period t. ΔEk,t(DT) represents the difference between 
current intrinsic value and past period average (median or closing) price.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
mean  212 4.4  40.3  -117.0  164.5 
median  212 5.0  43.0  -116.0  185.0  ΔPk,t 
closing  212 1.6  64.4  -235.0  290.0 
ΔEk,t(DT) 216  1.2  76.1  -179.4  227.8 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
ΔPk,t  Independent Variable 
mean median  closing 
ΔEk,t(DT) 0.38  (8.48
***) 0.34  (7.12
***) 0.42  (5.13
***) 
privatek  1.78 (0.39)  0.54 (0.11)  2.66 (0.33) 
environmentk(=neutral) 17.15  (3.08
***) 17.06  (2.78
***) 7.74  (0.77) 
environmentk(=bullish) 28.79  (5.17
***) 29.00  (4.72
***) 25.87  (2.57
**) 
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Table VI. Disposition Effect Prediction: Average Adjustment ratio tabulated by Capital Gain 
and Surprise Sign 
 
The  prediction is based on Frazzini’s (2006) interpretation of disposition effect. 
 Surprise 
Capital Gain  +  – 
+  Incomplete positive adjustment; 
More offers to sell;  Complete negative adjustment; 
–  Complete Positive adjustment;  Incomplete negative adjustment; 








Table VI I. Actual Adjustment Ratio and Number of Asks 
  
(.) shows standard deviation; [.] shows # of observations. If the disposition effect holds, For Panel A, the shaded areas should show 
less drift than non-shaded area; for Panel B, the upper-left shaded area should have more offers to sell and the bottom-right should 
have fewer offers to sell.
  Panel A: Average Adjustment    Panel B: Average Number of Asks 
 Surprise     Surprise 
Overhang +  –
 
 Overhang +  –
  0.6 -0.5    17.8  15.4 
+ 
(2.3) (4.6)   
+ 
(8.3)  (8.6) 
-0.0  0.4   20.6  18.0  –
  (0.7)  (0.5)   
–
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Table VIII. Feasible GLS Regressions on the Effect of Information Asymmetry on Prices 
 
Note: The number in parenthesis is the z-statistics. *** stands for 0.01 significance level. The coefficients are estimated with 
generalized least square, with heteroskedasticity and panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation. diff_pricej,k,t is the price difference 
(measured in mean, median and closing price) at period t between public information session j and private information session k; 
diff_infoj,k,t is the difference in information implied intrinsic value at period t between the informed investors in session j and the 
uninformed investors in session k; diff_VARj,k,t is the risk exposure difference at period t between the informed investors in  
session j  and the uninformed investors in session k. Other conditions are exactly the same for each paired observation. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
mean  120 -3.97  66.4  -381.8  435.7 
median  120 -2.9  68.3  -380.0 439.5  diff_pricej,k,t 
closing  120 -5.7  79.8  -380  439 
diff_infoj,k,t  120 0  21.2  -44.4 44.4 
diff_VARj,k,t  120 -4000  2563.8  -8000  0 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
diff_pricej,k,t  Independent Variable 
mean median  Closing 
diff_infoj,k,t  0.18 (0.66)  0.17 (0.59)  0.34 (1.01) 
diff_VARj,k,t  -0.8×10
-3  (-0.36)  -0.2×10
-3 (0.09)  -0.2×10
-3 (-0.57) 
environmentk (=neutral)  -15.45 (-1.06)  -14.88 (-0.99)  -30.1 (-1.74) 
environmentk (=bullish)  5.18 (0.35)  9.8 (0.65)  -5.6 (0.32) 
constant  -3.90 -2.10  -3.82 
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Table IX. Expected Return  for Trading Periods 
 
Expected return is computed knowing the expected intrinsic value at each period. There are 8 observations in each cell. At 
each period, the risk exposed for holding a unit of asset is the same across environment. Later periods face less 
uncertainty. Bullish environments are associated with positive expected returns while bearish environments are associated 
with negative expected returns. 
Period 1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9  Mean 
Bullish   28.00% 25.00% 20.10% 21.60% 19.70% 14.30% 10.20% 10.00% 6.40%  15.70% 
Neutral  -9.00% -3.80% -0.70% 0.40% 2.20% 4.00% 1.60% 3.30% 2.40%  0.00% 





Table X. The Relative Frequencies of Under- and Over-reaction in Simulation Results 
 
The simulation results suggest that the ratio of adjustment responsiveness is the driving determinants of the 
relative frequencies (number of trading periods) for under- and over-reaction. When adjustment displays 
inertia, under-reaction prevails. Consistent with empirical results, over-reaction tend to arise more in the 
long term perspective. 




Under-reaction Over-reaction Under-reaction Over-reaction 
Insufficient N  (0.27,  0.81
2)  67.8% 32.2% 62.6% 37.4% 
Appropriate  N (1, 0.81
2)  49.8% 50.2% 49.9% 50.1% 
Excessive N  (1.73,  0.81
2)  32.6% 67.4% 45.9% 54.1% 
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Figure 1 
Panel A: Bearish Environment, u = 20, –d = –60
 
Starting Value  Expected Value  Book Value 
Figure 1. Asset book value random walk paths. Path 1 shows the set of draws randomly 
selected before any sessions were run; Path 2 shows the set of draws reversed (+ ↔ −) from Path 1.All 
sessions used either the Path 1 or Path 2 set of draws. In all news regimes the asset has a starting book 
value of 540 cents, and the initial standard deviations for the liquidation value distributions are 120 for all 
three environments. The only difference lies with the relative sizes of the potential upward and downward 
surprises, causing their expected liquidation (intrinsic) values to differ. The liquidation value distribution 
is approximately normal if the number of trading periods is large enough. As trading periods approach 
liquidation, the standard deviation of intrinsic value declines. The dotted line shows the level of book 
value, while solid line gives the intrinsic (expected liquidating) value. In the neutral environment, the two 
values completely overlap because the expectation of the surprise is zero.  
Left: Path 1  Right: Path 2 
Panel B: Neutral Environment, u = 40, –d = –40













Figure 2.Transaction price time series.   The left side consists of 12 sessions with 
public information, while the right side consists of 12 sessions with private information. The dashed 
curve is the Lowess least square fitted line that best captures the curvature of the transaction price 
time series. 
Panel 1-A: Bearish Environment + Public 
Panel 1-B: Neutral Environment + Public Information
Panel 1-C: Bullish Environment + Public Information Panel 2-C:  Bullish Environment + Private Information 
Panel 2-B: Neutral Environment + Private Information 












Long Term Classification  Short Term Classification 
Figure 3. Deviations of average price per period from intrinsic value. The red 
horizontal lines indicate a deviation of zero. The solid lines represent public information markets, while the
dashed lines represent private information markets. Deviations also represent expected returns. The bearish 
environment exhibits consistent downward drift toward intrinsic value, the bullish environment exhibits 
consistent upward drift, while the neutral environment exhibits flat or reversals in return series. 
 
Figure 4. Identification of under- and over-reaction with price migration rule. In both 
graphs, the deviations are measured as the absolute difference between current period average price, Pt, and current 
intrinsic value, Et(DT). In the short term classification, the sign of the deviation is negative if Pt is on the same side of 
Et(DT) as Pt-1 is compared to Et-1(DT),. In the long term classification, the sign of the deviation is negative if Pt is on the 
same side of Et(DT) as the mean of all previous prices P1…t-1 is compared to the mean of all previous intrinsic values 
E1…t-1(DT). 






Figure 6. Paired difference in adjustment ratio. Each pair compares the adjustment 
rate in a period of the private information sessions and its counterpart in the public information 
sessions. DHS predicts the distribution to have a negative mean, while the above histogram reveals a
close to zero mean, symmetric distribution. 
Figure 5. Under-reaction magnitude histograms.  Both short term (197:41) and long term (160:78) 
histograms suggest a dominance of under-reaction. This is distinct from pure return sign based identifications (113:80
for short term return and 93:83 for long term return.) There is a tendency for overreaction to rise over a longer term 
perspective. 
 




Figure 7. Adjustment ratio histogram. Adjustment ratio is computed as the ratio between 
the price adjustment magnitude and the change in the intrinsic value. A ratio between zero and 1 is 
considered as insufficient adjustment; a ratio larger than 1 is considered as excessive adjustment; and a 
ratio smaller than zero is considered as opposite adjustment. 
Figure 8. Subjective probability and belief continuation. Subjective probability is 
computed as the probability of a Head draw in each new period that could support the 
ongoing price. The objective probability is always 0.5 in any period. Any probability 
falling outside the interval [0,1] represents a price that is impossible to be justified by 
any of the possible liquidation values. 
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Fitted Line for All 
Bullish Environment  
Neutral Environment  
Bearish Environment  
Figure 9. Risk-Return Plot. The fitted line for  ε λ + • = t k t k VAR r E , , ) (  has a slope of 0.00, with z=-
0.21, p>|z|=0.83, which indicates that the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero. For any level of risk, the expected 
returns for the bullish environment tends to be larger than for the neutral environment, which in turn tends to be larger than
for the bearish environment.  
 







Figure 10. Simulation. Panel A utilizes the short-term perspective and Panel B utilizes the long-term 
perspective in defining under (over) reaction. For each block, 500 market sessions are conducted. For the 
first row, the mean adjustment ratio is 0.27; for the second row, the mean adjustment ratio is 1; and for the 
third row, the mean adjustment ratio is 1.73. The relative frequencies of under- and over-reaction are 
primarily driven by the magnitude of short-term adjustments. 
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